Primer: On Chinese Diplomacy

By Michael Norris

Illustration by Lillian Katsapis

Throwing its weight around
Following the financial crisis of 2008, which left a dizzying number of Western economies hamstrung, China has practised a less cooperative brand of foreign policy which has garnered it few friends.  China’s recent exploits, including scuttling key initiatives at the Copenhagen Climate Change summit and its non-committal stance on Iran’s nuclear programme, have been unhelpful and counter-productive.  China’s presence in important international issues is welcome, yet the key challenge for the international system is to redirect China to a path of cooperation rather than antagonism and ambivalence.

‘Smile diplomacy’

Following the events of Tiananmen Square (1989), Deng Xiaoping, China’s great economic reformer, laid out guidelines for China’s foreign policy.  Known as the six principles – ‘observe developments soberly, maintain our position, meet challenges calmly, hide our capabilities and bide our time, remain free of ambition, never claim leadership’ – the sum of the guidelines is for China to be conciliatory and maintain a low profile on the international stage.  Since the 1980s, China has practised ‘smile diplomacy’, a phrase coined by Renmin University international relations professor, Shi Yinhong.  ‘Smile diplomacy’ was hugely successful, allowing China’s to secure the support of its Asian neighbours through aid, loans, and investment.  China even managed to maintain cordial relations with the US, despite the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (1999) and a collision between an American spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet (2001) threatening to destabilise the relationship.  China mostly stuck to Deng’s guidelines over three decades, allowing it to pursue economic development without serious foreign distractions.

Expect more, receive less
Much has changed since the implementation of ‘smile diplomacy’ in the 1980s.  China is still a developing country, but its economic clout has attracted worldwide attention.  The implication of this, according to Bill Emmott (former editor of The Economist) is that ‘the low profile recommended by Deng is no longer feasible.’  As China’s economic and diplomatic interests (such as commercial and energy ties with African and South American countries) spread, international expectations on China increase.  For instance, the then-President of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, called on China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system.  China, however, has been quick to shrug additional responsibility.  Whether over climate change, Iran’s nuclear programme, or territorial disputes with its East and South Asian neighbours, China has failed to meet rising international expectations.

Not quite ready to step up
Three reasons underpin China’s refusal to commit to responsibilities befitting its status as the third largest world economy.  Firstly, China is reluctant to join Western choruses calling for change in “rogue” states because of its deeply-rooted notion of sovereignty as inviolable.  China refuses to tolerate external interference in its own domestic matters, including on Taiwan, Tibet, the value of Chinese currency (yuan,) and human rights abuses.  By extension, it rejects interference in the domestic issues of other states, although it has made recent exceptions for humanitarian purposes.  Secondly, China continues to hide behind its status as a developing country, fearing that other labels may place the spotlight on its record of domestic repression, internet censorship, and environmental degradation.  Indeed, China’s unhelpful stance at Copenhagen was due to its self-endorsed image as a developing country, thereby allaying responsibility to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to developed countries.  Lastly, some of China’s most profitable commercial ties exist with unscrupulous international actors such as Sudan, Iran, Myanmar (Burma), Zimbabwe, and Venezuela.  Consequently, China is reluctant to press for change in these countries even where it may be beneficial, lest it face commercial backlash.

What is the West to do?

China has found convenient reasons to stay out of the international spotlight and to remain uncooperative.  With Sino-US relations fractious after President Obama approved arms sales to Taiwan and met the Dalai Lama, the US may face a tough task coaxing China into a more helpful stance.  However, by recognising Chinese concerns and accommodating China’s insecurity, Obama can maximize his chance to improve relations.  Positive steps have already been taken. Saudi Arabia, at America’s behest, has agreed to supply China with oil if it supports economic sanctions against Iranian elites.  Similar innovation is needed to turn China into a more obliging international actor.

No country is an island

Deng’s six principles guided Chinese foreign relations for the best part of 30 years.  Now that his principles are becoming less relevant to contemporary Chinese foreign policy, the Chinese leadership is attempting to forge its own path.  It is understandable that China’s post-six principles foreign policy has teething problems, but they could not have come at a worse time.  In particular, Iran is fast becoming a flashpoint, and multilateral action is needed.  To secure Chinese support, Western diplomats must state firmly what they need from China, be understanding of Chinese insecurities, and must teach China to associate cooperation with reward.  These are three principles even Deng Xiaoping would have been proud of.